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Precedent and Justice 
William D. Bader* and David R. Cleveland** 
Abstract 
Precedent is the cornerstone of common law method. It is the 
core mechanism by which the common law reaches just outcomes. 
Through creation and application of precedent, common law seeks 
to produce justice. The appellate courts' practice of issuing un-
published, non-precedential opinions has generated considerable 
discussion about the value of precedent, but that debate has cen-
tered on pragmatic and formalistic values. This essay argues that 
the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions does more than 
offend constitutional dictates and present pragmatic problems to 
the appellate system; abandoning precedent undermines justice 
itself. Issuance of the vast majority of decisions as non-
precedential tears the justice-seeking mechanism of precedent 
from the heart of our common law system. 
In Memoriam Judge RichardS. Arnold (1936 2004) 
"It is the property of a diamond ... to appear most brilliant in the 
dark, and surely a good man never shines to greater advantage 
than in the gloomy hour of adversity ."1 
Sarah Livingston Jay 
. . 
December 1779 
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cations. 
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. . 
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'k**[Editor's Note: Portions of this article with respect to the historical background and 
devel<lpment of precedent build off of the authors' previous insightful writings and exten-
sive research on the topic ()f precedent, particularly David R. Cleveland, Overturning the 
Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. App. 
Prac. & Proc·ess 61 (2009) and William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Precedent is the cornerstone of common law method, the concep-
tual vehicle allowing law and justice to merge as one. Most pro-
ponents of precedent seem to miss the inherently justice-seeking 
value of the concept, and, instead extol its pragmatic value.2 We 
contend much more: precedent is indeed where law meets justice. 
In this essay, we will briefly examine the meaning of justice 
from classical times to the present and illustrate why precedent is 
justice-seeking compared to other adjudicative methods that have 
been employed in legal history. Then, we will demonstrate how 
failure to abide by precedent in a specific case, without distin-
guishing or overruling the precedent, is an injustice. Failure to 
respect precedent systemically, as with the issuance of non-
precedential opinions, makes the law less just as a whole. 
II. THE MEANING OF JUSTICE AND PRECEDENT AS A JUSTICE-
SEEKING MECHANISM 
Our philosophy of justice can be traced directly from the classi-
cal Greek philosophers. 3 Although there was disagreement among 
them regarding the substantive content of justice, most philoso-
phers regard "equality'' (of some sort) as the framework of justice.4 
2. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (providing a fine 
and legally important survey of the pragmatic rationale for adherence to precedent). 
3. JOEL FEINBERG & JULES COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 389-90 (Wadsworth 2000). 
4. Id. 
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Aristotle is the most influential of the classical Greek thinkers 
on the subject of justice.5 He defines justice as proportionate 
equality. The essential requirement of justice for Aristotle is that 
like cases be treated alike or equally, in direct proportion to their 
alikeness or equality.s 
We certainly stand on the shoulders of the ancient Greeks and, 
most particularly, Aristotelian shoulders. Amartya Sen, the Nobel 
laureate and economist, recently wrote that, in theories of justice 
from the Enlightenment to the post-Enlightenment, through the 
present, equality is the common formal basis, regardless of sub-
stantive differences. 7 Sen explains: 
[These theories of justice] demand equality of something-
something that is regarded as particularly important in that 
theory. The theories can be entirely diverse (focusing on, say, 
equal liberty or equal income or equal treatment of everyone's 
rights or utilities), and they may be in combat with each oth-
er, but they still have the common characteristic of wanting 
equality of something: (some feature of significance in there-
spective approach). a 
The importance of precedent as inherently justice-seeking may 
be seen in the differences between the precedent-based common 
law compared to its immediate predecessors, such as trial by or-
deal or trial by combat. While the latter methods are rooted in 
mere chance or physical strength, the former is based on reason, 
equality and fairness. 
Trial by ordeal was prevalent in pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon Eng~ 
land.9 For freemen, the most common ordeal was the hot iron. 
Specifically, a hot iron bar was carried nine feet by the accused. 
The accused's burns were bandaged for three nights and were 
then uncovered. If the burns had healed, the accused was deemed 
not guilty or not liable by the judgment of God. If the burns had 
not substantially healed, the accused was deemed guilty or lia-
ble.10 It is indeed shocking how the legal method of ordeal is com-
5. ld. 
6. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J. L. Ackrill & J. 0. Urmson 
eds., David Ross et al. trans., Oxford University Press 1998). 
7. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 291-93 (2009). 
8. ld. at 291. 
9. THEODORE F. T. PLCUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 102 (The 
Lawyers Co~Operative Publishing Co. 1929). 
10. ld. at 102-03. 
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pletely unrelated to justice and is no different in rationality than a 
throw of the dice. 
The Norman Conquest of England in 1066 brought with it the 
trial by combat, which replaced the ordeal. 11 In civil cases, a bat-
tle was fought between "champions" who represented the par· 
ties.12 The champion was "originally a witness who was ... bound 
by homage to defend his lord's title."13 Later, champions formed a 
professional group and were hired by litigants in a manner vague-
ly similar to lawyers. 14 In criminal cases, the litigants were re-
quired to personally fight each other to the death. 15 As with trial 
by ordeal, trial by combat was a method completely unrelated to 
rational justice. Although it was believed that God determined 
the outcome of the combat, it was more accurately an institution of 
"might makes right." 
Within a century, however, Henry II began the process of unit-
ing England under a common system of laws.16 Soon, a more co-
herent system of law, involving both learned judges and profes-
sional bar, emerged. 17 The bench and bar, in the manner of all 
bureaucracies, began to keep records of their actions and the ar-
guments and decisions of courts then served as tools to guide ar-
guments by advocates and judgments by the courts. 18 By 1250, 
the common law system saw Henry de Bracton, an accomplished 
judge, attempting to explain the principles and procedures of Eng-
lish law through a collection of cases and an accompanying trea-
tise, demonstrating a strong belief in the value of precedents.19 
Even at this early stage, the core justice-seeking premise of the 
common law was that, "if like matters arise let them be decided by 
like, ... since the occasion is a good one for proceeding a similibus 
ad similia."20 Soon after Bracton's effort, the arguments and deci-
sions were being recorded in "the very words of judges and plead-
ers," and both counsel and the court cited to prior decisions and 
11. Id. at 104. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. PLUCKNETT, supra note 9, at 105. 
15. Id. 
16. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 13-14 (4th ed. 2002) 
("Against that uniform system, local custom would thereafter be seen at best as exceptional 
and at worst as exceptionable."). Id. at 14. 
17. Id. at 19. 
18. Id. 
19. J. W. TuBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN 
CONCEPTIONS 7-20 (2000). 
20. ld. at 19 
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knew full well that a decision would be viewed as precedent in lat· 
er cases.21 These records, while not individually binding in the 
modern sense, were viewed as evidence that the course of the 
common law was on the side of the advocate urging them .. 22 
In sixteenth century England, there was a dramatic transfor-
mation of legal methodology resulting in the modern common 
law.23 Harold J. Berman writes of the period: 
The new emphasis on the historicity of English law, that is, 
on the normative character of its historical development over 
generations and centuries, was manifested in new ways of 
systematizing it. The most obvious methodological manifesta-
tion of the new historical jurisprudence was the emergence of 
the modern doctrine of precedent.24 
In this historical approach, guided almost entirely by precedent 
or analogy to prior-similar cases, we see a critical connection be-
tween law and justice. Basic equality under the law, the essence 
of justice, was instituted by treating like cases alike. 
Sir Edward Coke was the most powerful judicial and scholarly 
champion of this precedent-based common law. Coke writes 
"Neminem opportet esse sapientiorem legibus: no man out of his 
own private reason ought to be wiser than the law, which is the 
perfection of reason."25 Specifically, Coke defines law as an "artifi-
cial perfection of reason" that incorporates a judicial dialectic of 
experience and legal precedent over time. 26 A judge is personally 
constrained by precedent to applying the law in a just-equal way, 
while continually refining the law by studying the precedents and 
the facts of new cases. In Coke's work was seen a keen focus on 
the nexus between the common law and justice via the utilization 
of precedent. 
Pioneering scholarship by William D. Bader27 and Henry P. 
Monaghan,28 respectively, and the great-seminal opinion of Judge 
21. BAKER, supra note 16, at 225 (citing Midhope v. Prior of Kirkham, 36 S.S. 178 
(1313) (Stanton, J.) (speaking of his decision, most likely directly to a reporter, "one may 
safely put that in his book for law."). 
22. BAKER, supra note 16, at 26. 
23. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 270 (2003). 
24. Id. 
25. Coke, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Lib. 2. Cap. 6. Sect. 138 (3d. ed. 1633). 
26. Id. 
27. William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 
VT. L. REV. 5, 9 (1994). 
; 
' I 
! 
' 
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Richard S. Arnold in Anastasoff v. U.S. 29 demonstrate that the 
common law respect for precedent inheres in the judicial power of 
the. United States under Article III by means of the Framers' in-
tent. Judicial respect for precedent is, therefore, a constitutional 
imperative by virtue of original meaning. 
There is a consensus that Sir William Blackstone's Commen-
taries on the Laws of England was the singularly most important 
. 
intellectual influence on the attorneys who drafted the Constitu-
tion.30 In fact, Blackstone's Commentaries "rank second only to 
the Bible as a literary and intellectual influence on the history of 
American institutions."3 I 
William D. Bader has previously concluded that Blackstone, in 
the tradition of Coke, "regarded precedent as the ultimate corner-
stone of the common law" and as a constraint on judges to justly 
decide like cases alike rather than ruling according to their indi-
vidual prejudices. 32 Blackstone writes on the justice-seeking func-
tion of precedent: "For it is an established rule to abide by former 
precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; as 
well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to 
waver with every new judge's opinion."33 Blackstone concludes, 
"the doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules 
must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust."34 
One of the most important Framers, Alexander Hamilton, was 
among the Blackstone-educated lawyers of the Founding.35 Hamil-
ton's intellectual preparation is manifest in his Federalist No. 78, 
where he explains and defends Article III, the judicial article, of 
the Constitution.36 Bader has demonstrated that Hamilton "main-
tained that the common law method, and more specifically a 
Blackstonian reverence for precedent, as the principal guarantee 
of the rule of law, was inherent in Article III."37 Thus, justice-
28. Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV.723,754(1988). 
29. 223 F.3d 898, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2000). 
30. See generally Bader, supra note 27, at 6-9. 
31. Bader, supra note 27, at 8 (citing ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LE'ITERS IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 11 (1984)). 
32. Bader, supra note 27, at 8-9 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS 69 (New ed., with the last corrections of the author 
... ,with notes/by John Frederick Archbold, London, 1811)). 
33. Bader, supra note 27, at 8 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at 69). 
34. Bader, supra note 27, at 9 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 32, at 70). 
35. Bader, supra note 27, at 9 (citing JACOB COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 29 (1982). 
36. Bader, supra note 27, at 9. 
37. Id. 
• 
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seeking precedent, treating similar cases equally, is built into the 
judicial function under the Constitution. In Hamilton's words: 
"To avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensible that 
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which 
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case 
that comes before them.''38 
The earliest treatise of importance about the U.S. Constitution 
was Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the United States.39 Bader has shown that Story believed, "the 
common law method, as characterized by a Blackstonian-style 
reverence for precedent, was rooted in Article 111."40 
This essentially served justice by insuring that judges would 
treat similar cases equally. In a pertinent passage from his Com-
mentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Story wrote: 
Ours is emphatically a government of laws, and not of men; 
and judicial decisions of the highest tribunal, by the known 
course of the common law, are considered, as establishing the 
true construction of the laws, which are brought into contro-
versy before it. The case is not alone considered as decided 
and settled; but the principles of the decision are held, as 
precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the same na-
ture. This is the constant practice under our whole system of 
jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when 
they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always has 
been considered, as the great security of our rights, our liber-
ties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law is 
justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent principles, 
and not dependent upon the caprice, or will of particular 
judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated 
by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disre-
gard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, 
without reference to the settled course of antecedent princi-
ples.41 
38. Bader, supra note 27 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Isaac Krammick ed. 1987)). 
39. RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, Introduction to JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, XI-XII (photo. 
Reprint 1987) (1833). 
40. Bader, supra note 27, at 10. 
4L Bader, supra note 27, at 10-11 (citing ROTUNOA, supra note 39, at 126~27). 
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Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in his most important extra-judicial 
scholarship, The Nature of the Judicial Process, provides a glimpse 
into his understanding of precedent. Justice C.ardozo wrote: "If a 
group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the 
same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate 
cases on opposite principles."42 Clearly, Justice Cardozo described, 
in other words, the essence of precedent as treating similar cases 
equally and therefore justly. 
Justice William 0. Douglas, in a fascinating extra-judicial piece, 
also attributed faithfulness to precedent as a matter of equality of 
justice. He wrote "there will be no equal justice under law if a 
negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the after-
noon."43 
s ·urprisingly, Karl Llewellyn, hardly a legal formalist, sensed 
that equal justice was the key to understanding the common law 
concept of precedent. He wrote, most perceptively, that "[t]he 
force of precedent in the law is heightened by ... that curious, al-
most universal, sense of justice which urges that all men are 
properly to be treated alike in like circumstances."44 
Most of the U.S. Supreme Court's more recent jurisprudence 
supportive of precedent is best exemplified by Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.45 In Casey, exclusively 
pragmatic issues are adduced to support adherence to precedent.46 
A rare exception to such pragmatically-driven cases is an opin-
ion authored by Justice Souter and joined by Justice Stevens, in 
which four additional justices concurred in judgment, James B. 
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.41 The Court in Beam held that a 
prior Supreme Court civil ruling, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 
which invalidated a Hawaiian distillery tax scheme, applies retro ... 
actively to Beam's present claim at bar arising out of similar facts 
antedating the prior ruling. 48 
Justice Souter wrote that when the Supreme Court has applied 
a rule of law to litigants in one civil case, it must apply the same 
42. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1921) (quoting 
W. G. MILLER, THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE 335 (1903)). 
43. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949). 
44. WILLIAM TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 232 (Robert 
Stevens et al. eds., University of Oklahoma ed., University of Oklahoma Press 1985) (citing 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Case Law, 3 ENCYC. OF Soc. SCI. 249 (1931)). 
45. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
46. Id. 
47. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
48. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 532-544. 
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rule, now a precedent, to similarly situated civil litigants who sub-
sequently appear before the Court, unless it is barred by proce-
dural requirements or res judicata.49 He rejected various prag-
matic arguments for such adherence to precedent and announced, 
instead, that "selective prospectivity ... breaches the principle 
that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a 
fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law gener-
ally."50 Justice Souter went on to succinctly state his justice ... 
seeking rationale in applying precedent, when he wrote that 
"equality drives us."51 
III. ABANDONING PRECEDENT UNDERMINES THE LAW'S ABILITY TO 
RENDER JUSTICE 
Despite the importance of precedent to justice, modern Ameri-
can courts frequently abandon precedent by issuing "unpublished 
opinions." These opinions are generally viewed as non-
precedential, though no principled basis for removing some deci-
sions from the body of precedent has ever been enunciated. 52 If 
the principle of precedent is intrinsic to the common law system of 
justice, and we argue that it is, then it must be adhered to unless 
some other principal is deemed to be overriding. Mere expediency 
or efficiency is not sufficient. 53 
The initial proposal for denying precedential value to some deci-
sions failed to locate any principle of jurisprudence that would 
justify the creation of unpublished opinions and non-precedential 
49. Id. at 544. 
50. Id. at 537. 
51. Id. at 542. In an earlier case, Griffith v. Kentucky, Justice Blackmun had ruled 
pragmatic considerations are trumped by the requirement of equal justice, with the latter 
mandating that similarly situated criminal defendants be treated the same in questions 
regarding the retroactivity of a new constitutional-criminal law precedent to pending or 
non-final criminal cases~ 4 79 U.S. 314 (1987). 
52. See David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning 
Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61,70-84 (2009) (noting the 
creators of the federal unpublication system's intentional refusal to consider the propriety 
of their sub silentio denial of precedent to some opinions, viewing it as a "morass of juris-
prudence."). See also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, 
COMM. ON USE OF APP. CT. ENERGIES, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS: 
A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE ENERGIES OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL 
ON APPEIJ.ATE JUSTICE 20 (1973) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION]. 
53. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) ("although efficacious administra· 
tion of governmental programs is not without some importance, 'the Constitution recogniz· 
es higher values than speed and efficiency."'); citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 
(1972). 
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precedents.54 In fact, the whole idea of justifying such a funda-
mental departure from the common law's treatment of precedent 
was dubbed a "morass of jurisprudence," and no further inquiry 
was made into the propriety of courts removing their decisions 
from the body of precedent. 55 Without any jurisprudential justifi-
cation or even open examination, our federal judicial system has 
abandoned the core mechanism of the common law in order to 
manage the increased caseload. By creating and perpetuating a 
system of non-precedential decision-making within our common 
law courts, it has unwittingly and unreflectively weakened the 
cornerstone of our system of justice. 
Hopefully, upon long-overdue reflection, we will find a different 
way to address the "crisis of volume" in the federal courts (and our 
American courts generally), and end this system that runs counter 
to human conceptions of justice, United States constitutional 
guarantees, and the very notion of justice itself. 
A. Abandoning Precedent Is Contrary to Lay and Lawyer Con-
ceptions of Justice 
Failure to abide by precedent in a single case is an injustice, un-
less the court can distinguish the case or overrule the law. Failure 
to abide by precedent systemically also makes the law less certain, 
less reliable, and less just as a whole. 
Humans have an inherent expectation that precedent will be 
followed and that, when followed, it results in fair outcomes. 56 
Failure to follow precedent results in a sense of unfairness and 
injustice unless a reason for departure is given. 57 From young 
children asking to be treated as older siblings were treated to the 
expectation of equal work for equal pay, we perceive justice in 
fairness and equality and injustice in different treatment without 
justification. Indeed, decision-makers of all kinds fear "setting a 
bad precedent" because they feel they will be expected to act the 
same in the future, even though no formal mechanism exists for 
enforcing precedent in that fashion. Precedent is fundamental to 
even our lay perceptions of fairness and justice. 58 
54. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone, supra note 52, at 89-90; see also STANDARDS 
FOR PuBLICATION, 20 (1973) (avoiding the issue of denying cases precedent as a "morass of 
juris prudence"). 
55. STANDARDS OF PUBLICATION, supra note 52, at 20-21. 
56. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987). 
57. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1985). 
58. Schauer, supra note 56. 
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It is understandable then that adherence to precedent is critical 
to our formal, government-run system of justice. 59 At its core, the 
common law is about determining the applicable legal principles 
and whether they apply to given facts by referencing past applica-
tions to similar facts. 6o Karl Llewellyn explained this well when 
he wrote: 
We have discovered that rules alone, mere forms of words, are 
worthless. We have learned that the concrete instance, the 
heaping of concrete instances, the present1 vital memory of a 
multitude of concrete instances, is necessary in order to make 
any general proposition, be it rule of law or any other, mean 
anything at all.6I 
In every case, the court applies the law to the litigants' facts and 
doing justice in harmony with what has been done before and 
providing another example for future parties to know what the 
law is. This is the process of building and refining the common 
law that Lord Coke viewed as the strength of the common law 
form of meting out justice.62 
The law is made up of applications of law, not just enunciations 
. . 
of law, which is why we talk of the common law being "deprived" 
of precedent63 and why Judge Arnold was troubled by the issuance 
of unpublished opinions: 
If we mark an opinion as unpublished, it is not precedent~ We 
are free to disregard it without even saying so . . . . We are 
perfectly free to depart from past opinions if they are un-
59. See, e.g., Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastosoff, Noncitation Rules, 
and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002) 
(examining the contemporary surveys of federal judges and lawyers). See also Lauren 
Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion,, 87 MICH. L. REV 940 (1989). 
60. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH; ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-69 (1930). 
61. Id. at 12. 
62. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W.VA. L. REV. 
43, 108 n.503 (2001); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original intent, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1537, n.91 (1987). 
63. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Se_cret Law: What 
Predicts Publication in the .United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 73 (2001). 
See also Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or 
Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater 
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 785-801 (1995); Pamela Foa, A Snake in th.e Path of the 
Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV~ 309, 338-41 (1977); 
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the 
United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHL L. REV. 573 (1981). 
. . 
• 
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published, and whether to publish them is entirely our own 
choice.64 
This practice would not have sat well with the many common 
law thinkers noted in Part I of this article, it does not sit well with 
us, and it did not sit well with Judge Richard S. Arnold: 
I would take the position that all decisions have precedential 
significance. To be sure, there are many cases that look like 
previous cases, and that are almost identical. In each in-
stance, however, it is possible to think of conceivable reasons 
why the previous case can be distinguished, and when a court 
decides that it cannot be, it is necessarily holding that the 
proffered distinctions lack merit under the law. This holding 
itself is a conclusion of law with precedential significance ... 
Every case has some precedential value, maybe not much, but 
some.65 
The fundamental nature of precedent as inherent in our legal 
system is apparent in the actions of both lawyers and judges, who 
have continued to use unpublished opinions despite the practice 
during the last three decades of limited publication, citation, and 
precedent. 
Lawyers and judges continue to find value in unpublished opin-
ions and seem to reject the idea that these opinions lack value.66 
Surveys of judges and lawyers in the federal system demonstrate 
that designating opinions unpublished has not prevented their 
use.67 The White Commission Report, the result of a study of the 
federal judiciary's structure undertaken in the late 1990s, re-
vealed that federal judges and lawyers looked to and cited un-
published opinions with a frequency that suggested that they 
found them to be of value. 68 More recent studies by the Federal 
64. RichardS. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
219, 221 (1999). 
65. Id. at 222-23 (emphasis in original removed). 
66. Robel, The Practice of Precedent, supra note 59, at 401 ("[E]vidence suggests that 
lawyers and judges value these opinions despite the rules limiting citation. This valuation, 
in turn, suggests a cultural, rather than rule-based conception of stare decisis."). 
67. Robel, The Practice of Precedent, supra note 59. See also Robel, The Myth of the 
Disposable Opinion, supra note 59. 
68. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. CTS. OF APPEALS, 
WORKING PAPERS, at 3 (1998); COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. 
CTS. OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, at ix (1998). See also Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at 
Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
199, 235, tbl. 6 (2001); Robel, The Practice of Precedent, supra note 59, at 405-07 (summa· 
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Judicial Center ("FJC") and the Administrative Office ("AO'') sup-
port these findings. 69 Likewise, when the federal bench and bar 
were invited to discuss the new rule permitting citation of un-
published opinions, these findings were further corroborated and 
"often stated in emphatic terms."7° For example, many lawyers 
and judges reject the idea that a court can predict which cases will 
have precedential value because "[o]nly when a case comes along 
with arguably comparable facts does the precedential relevance of 
an early decision-with-opinion arise ... Lacking omniscience, an 
appellate panel cannot predict what may come before its court in 
future days."71 Recent studies by academics confirm the courts' 
inability to determine ex ante which cases are of interest to later 
litigants as precedent and which are not. 72 That is because no 
such distinction exists. 73 Every decision a court makes is as prec-
edential or non-precedential as a later court applying that decision 
finds it to be based on the facts at bar.74 It has been aptly noted 
that, "[l]arge numbers of participants in the federal appellate sys-
tem, including judges, use unpublished opinions in ways not con-
templated by the publication, although completely consistent with 
common-law understandings of practice surrounding precedent/'75 
rizing the relevant data from the White Commission's surveys of federal judges and law·-
yers). 
69. TIM REGAN ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED 
OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 10, 24-26, 39, 45-48 
(2005); see also The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appea.ls, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 30, 65-66, 71 (2005); David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Lq,st Stone: 
The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 61, 101-02. 
70. Minutes of the 2004 Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules and Procedure, 8 (Apr. 
13~ 14 2004) available at 
http://www. uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/app0404. pdf. 
71. Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 773 (2003). 
72. Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog that Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, Judicial Con-
ference Rulemaking, and Federal Public Defenders, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1491, 1550-51 
(2005); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 63, at 120. See also Mark D. Hindberks & Steve A. 
Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law:· A Proposal for the Elimination of Rules Prohibit-
ing the Citation of Unpublished Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 Washburn 
L.J. 155 (1992) (collecting an overwhelming number of Kansas appellate cases in which 
law-making opinions were designated as non-precedential). 
73. The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly acknowledged the concept of 
a non-precedential opinion. At most, it has acknowledged that the circuits believe un-
published opinions to be without precedential value. See C.I.R. v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 
(1987) ("The Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction regardless of nonpublication and 
regardless of any assumed lack of precedential effect of a ruling that is unpublished."). 
74. LLEWELLYN, supra note 60, at 52 (stating that it is the later precedent-applying 
court that determines the scope of the earlier precedent-writing court's decision regardless 
of the words earlier court). 
75. Robel, The Practice of Precedent, supra note 59, at 414. 
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The adoption of non-citation rules regarding unpublished opin-
ions allowed circuits to strip these decisions' precedential value 
sub silentio and without justification. 76 In fact, the committee 
that proposed the non-citation rules considered declaring the deci-
sions non-precedent outright but decided not to, fearing it a "mo-
rass of jurisprudence."77 The committee, therefore, decided to rely 
on the principle of out of sight, out of mind, hoping that the "corre-
spondence of publication and precedential value on one hand, and 
of non-publication and non-precedential value on the other" would 
reduce the precedential value of unpublished opinions without 
anyone ever having to justify that result.78 
But some of the circuit judges charged with issuing these deci-
sions perceived the threat to justice such a practice entails. Judg-
es Holloway, Baldock, and Burnett of the Tenth Circuit expressed 
their justice-focused concern in a dissent to the adoption of a no-
citation rule: 
The most important reasons for permitting citation of pub-
lished precedents are just as cogent to me in the case of un-
published rulings. Each ruling, published or unpublished, in-
volves the facts of a particular case and the application of law-
to the case. Therefore all rulings of this court are precedents, 
like it or not, and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion 
by merely banning their citation. No matter how insignificant 
a prior ruling might appear to us, any litigant who can point 
to a prior decision of the court and demonstrate that he is enti-
tled to prevail under it should be able to do so as a matter of 
essential justice and fundamental fairness. To deny a litigant 
this right may well have overtones of a constitutional in-
fringement because of the arbitrariness, irrationality, and un-
equal treatment of the rule.79 
The dissenters questioned what they ought to do if they discov-
ered a prior unpublished opinion whose ruling would be control-
ling if it were not technically unpublished and theoretically not 
precedential. Principle and common law jurisprudence demands, 
they determined, "[w]e would clearly have the duty as a matter of 
76. STANDARDS FOR PuBLICATION, supra note 52, at 20-21. 
77. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 52, at 20-21. 
78. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 52, at 20-21. 
79. Re: Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit. Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 
F.2d 36, 37 (lOth Cir. 1992) (Halloway, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
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basic justice to apply it, and in so doing logic would demand citing 
the earlier ruling."so 
Precedent's centrality to justice, or at least common law justice, 
is apparent in the actions of lawyers and judges and their willing-
ness to ignore and eventually remove rules contrary to precedent., 
The power of precedent within our legal system is too fundamental 
and necessary to be set aside forever by rule. Three decades of 
circuit rules creating non-precedential precedents have been una-
ble to overcome the strong cultural and practical commitment to 
the idea of precedent as inherent in every decision courts make. 81 
B. Abandoning Precedent Denies Justice-Seeking Constitutional 
Guarantees 
Precedent is the cornerstone of common law adjudication and is 
the vehicle by which the common law system achieves justice. 
Indeed, as Justice Story has noted, '~[a] more alarming doctrine 
could not be promulgated by any American court than that it was 
at liberty to disrega.rd all former rules and decisions and to decide 
for itself, without reference to the settled course. of antecedent 
principles.''82 Yet, a court iss.uing an unpublished opinion essen-
tially declares, "this law is good only for this one time and place;' 
we need not follow or even acknowledge this decision in the fu-
ture." That the federal courts issue over eighty percent of its opin-
ions this way, suggests that Justice Story's fear has come to pass: 
the American courts have abandoned precedent as a touchstone of 
jurisprudence.83 A court that can decide that its decision in the 
present case need not be followed in the future and that prior de-
cisions need not be followed because. of the manner in which they 
were published has abandoned fidelity to precedent as a governing 
concept. 
To the individual party, abandonment of precedent creates an 
unjust, perhaps unconstitutionally unjust, outcome. First, courts 
are expected to exercise judicial authority over disputes to deter-
mine how the law applies to each case. This authority is limited 
80. Re: Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals, 955 F.2d at 37 (Halloway, J.t dissenting). 
81. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra note 59, at 414. 
82. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 349-
50 (1833) (1991). 
83. One review of unpublished opinions found them replete with evidence that prece-
dent is not being followed, resulting in unpublished opinions containing novel interpreta-
tions of the law, reversals of what the district court believed to be the law, split decisions, 
decisions a,t variance with other panels of the same appellate courts, and, decisions that 
evidence circuit splits. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 63. 
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by precedent such that what has been done in the past is done 
again, unless some rational basis for a departure is found. 84 Liti-
gants expect their case to be decided in adherence to the court's 
prior rulings and repeat-litigants expect that a ruling they receive 
one day is the same ruling they would receive the next. The 
court's unfettering itself from creating and following precedents 
leads to blatantly unjust results for litigants involved. Take, for 
example, the travails of Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART), a qua-
si-governmental agency that received qualified immunity in an 
unpublished opinion of the Fifth Circuit, only to have that quali-
fied immunity stripped away by a published opinion of the Fifth 
Circuit two years later without any distinguishing of the facts of 
the two cases, nor any dispute about the principle of law in-
volved.85 
Similarly, the court's failure to explain its departure from prior 
law leads to unjust results. For example, in NLRB v. Family Fare, 
Inc., 86 the Sixth Circuit issued an unpublished opinion that direct-
ly contradicted the published law of the circuit.87 Both parties 
were confused by the alteration of substantive law in an un-
published opinion. Both parties perceived that this opinion was 
precedent for future decisions. Family Fare felt that it was treat-
ed differently than litigants in prior cases, noting, "[t]he Sixth Cir-
cuit has subjected the election here to a legal standard different 
than the one that applies in every other comparable union election 
case in the Sixth Circuit."88 Likewise, the NLRB also perceived 
this as an alteration of the governing law, albeit a favorable one, 
and to make sure that alteration would be made permanent, it 
urged the Sixth Circuit to publish the opinion because it "'provides 
84. Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F~3d 898, 902 (8th Cir.), vacated 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 
2000) (noting that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that 
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point 
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them .... "). 
85. Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en bane); Anderson v. Dallas 
Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493 (N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 29, 1998), affd, 180 F. 3d 265, (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 1062 (1999). 
86. N.L.R.B. v. Family Fare, Inc., 205 F. App'x 403 (6th Cir. 2006). 
87. Petitioner Family Fare explained that the Sixth Circuit's published standard held 
that "[t]he party challenging the election need not introduce proof of actual coercion," while 
the Sixth Circuit panel's unpublished opinion in Family Fare, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. held, "[s]ome 
showing of coercion is required to sustain a finding of objectionable condu.ct." See Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Family Fare, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 551 U.S. 1133 (2007) (No. 06-1536), 
2007 WL 1481871 at *4. 
88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Family Fare, 551 U.S. 1133 (No. 06·1536) at *6. 
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much-needed guidance on a new approach to what previously 
[has] been an area of dispute between the Board and the Sixth 
Circuit. '"89 
If, as we have proposed, justice is primarily a matter of equality, 
few constitutional protections embody that justice more than 
Equal Protection.90 The practice of abandoning precedent by issu-
ing unpublished opinions has long been viewed as contrary to 
Equal Protection.91 The uncertain precedential status of the 
court's unpublished opinions leads to situations that treat similar-
ly situated litigants in a disparate manner.92 As the Family Fare 
and DART cases above starkly illustrate, similarly situated par-
ties (or even the same party at different times) can come before 
the court and receive diametrically opposed treatment. That is 
unjust on a fundamental level. It is the opposite of how the com-
mon law should function. 
Another constitutional protection aimed at promoting justice is 
that of due process. Due process is the duty owed by government 
to afford fair process before depriving someone of life, liberty, or 
property.93 This constitutional guarantee is fundamentally a duty 
of government to follow a fair process of decision-making and to 
both ensure fair play toward individuals and to minimize substan-
tively unfair deprivations of life, liberty. or property.94 Traditional 
common law procedures have been considered the lodestar for de-
termining fair process: 
As this Court has stated from its first due process cases, tra-
ditional practice provides a touchstone for constitutional 
analysis. Because the basic procedural protections of the 
common law have been regarded as so fundamental, very few 
89. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.L.R.B.'s Motion for Publication). 
90. The requirement of treating similarly situated litigants in a similar manner is a 
direct application of Aristotle's "proportionate equality." See generally ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 6. 
91. See, e.g., William J. Muller, Chipping Away at the Dam: Anastasoff v. United States 
and the Future of Unpublished Decisions in the United States Court of Appeals and Beyond, 
50 DRAKE L. REV. 181 (2001); Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff· The Procedural Due 
Process Argument Rules Prohibiting Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695 
{2001); Jon A. Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth 
Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195 (2001). 
92. Strongman, supra note 91, at 220. 
93. Analisa Pratt, A Call for Uniformity in Appellate Courts' Rules Regarding Citation 
of Unpublished Opinions, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 195, 214 (2005); Wade, supra note 
91, at 717. 
94. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972). 
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cases have arisen in which a party has complained of their 
denial. In fact, most of our due process decisions involve ar-
guments that traditional procedures provide too little protec-
tion and that additional safeguards are necessary to ensure 
compliance with the Constitution. Nevertheless, there are a 
handful of cases in which a party has been deprived of liberty 
or property without the safeguards of common-law procedure. 
When the absent procedures would have provided protection 
against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has 
not hesitated to find the proceedings violative of due pro-
cess.95 
There are no traditional practices more fundamental to the 
common law than the practice of precedent. What was adjudicat-
ed yesterday must be followed, distinguished, or the underlying 
principle rejected, and failure to do so is an abandonment of the 
common law system itself. Individuals order their affairs and 
plan their behaviors to conform with existing law. They do so with 
an expectation that the law as applied to them will be the same as 
it has been applied to others. Failure to do so denies individuals 
justice by denying the basic protections that: 1) past decisions can 
be relied upon as law and 2) the court deciding the individual case 
will do so in a manner that shapes the law going forward. It is 
obvious why the public desires the first of these protections; they 
have ordered their affairs in reliance and fairness requires equal 
treatment. But the second protection is also important. 
Knowledge that the decision stands as possible precedent for fu-
ture cases assures litigants that their case is not sui generis and 
holds the court accountable. A common law court ought not be 
able to issue a decision good only for a single time and place. 
Abandoning precedent causes great harm to individual litigants 
and individuals in society who might be litigants (which, given the 
breadth of conduct governed by modern law, is all of us). But it 
also causes dire systemic harms to our common law system of jus-
tice. It creates perverse incentives and allows for unjust practices 
and outcomes. 
95. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430-32 (1994) (holding that "Oregon 
has removed that safeguard which the common law provided without providing any substi-
tute procedure and without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any 
way subsided over time") (internal citation omitted). See also Wade, supra note 91, at 717. 
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C. Abandoning Precedent Causes Systemic Harm to our Justice 
System 
The ability of a deciding court to mark its opinions as preceden-
tial or non-precedential at the time of rendering the decision is an 
abandonment of the notion of precedent and results in a less just 
system overall. These systemic injustices fall into roughly five 
categories of harms. 
First, the ability to render decisions that are not precedential 
encourages inappropriate strategic thinking among judges.H6 
Judge RichardS. Arnold expressed this grave concern: 
[I]f, after hearing argument; a judge in conference thinks that 
[sic] a certain decision should be reached, but also believes 
that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she 
can achieve the result, assuming agreement by the other 
members of th,e panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished 
opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug.97 
Judge Patricia M. Wald of the D.C. Circuit confirmed that such 
"horse-trading'' behavior does take place: 
[A] double track system allows for deviousness and abuse. I 
have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished 
decision incorp,orating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid 
a time.-consuming public debate about what law controls. I 
have even seen wily would be dissenters go alon.g with a re-
sult they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a prece-
dent. We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues under the ·· 
rug.9s 
The frequency of strategic thinking of this type, the type that 
causes eases to be decided based on factors not related to the case 
. . . . 
at bar, is unknown. But at least one study has found such think-
ing on a broader scale. 99 A study of asylum cases in the Ninth Cir-
cuit has indicated that there is strategic decision-making about 
publication among judges unrelated to the facts of the underlying 
96. Arnold, supra note 64, at 223. 
97. Arnold, supra note 64, at 223. 
98. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results. of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995) (discussing her own observations as a judge 
on the D.C. Circuit). 
99. David S. Law, Strategic -Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum 
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 823 (2005) ("[t]he empirical literature on 
publication is sparse."). 
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case.100 Other studies have indicated that many unpublished 
opinions are lengthy, comple.x, or otherwise bear indicia of being 
publication-worthy-yet something unrelated to the substance of 
the case has caused them to go unpublished. 1o1 This inappropriate 
use of strategic thinking about publieation. in making judicial deci-
sions has long concerned Justice Stevens.102 He recently ex .. 
pressed his concern quite candidly, stating: "I tend to vote to grant 
[certiorari] more on unpublished opinions, on the theory that occa-
sionally judges will use the unpublished opinion as a device to 
reach a decision that might be a little hard to justify." 103 There is 
a significant and warranted concern that judges who seek a par-
ticular result not justified by current law· may be able to obtain 
that result, co-opt would-be dissenters, or otherwise subvert the 
normal judicial process simply by agreeing that any decision ren-
dered would be unpublished and outside the body of preeedent.104 
This problem does not presuppose judges of ill-will or malice. 
Even in the e,arliest experimentation with limited publication and 
' ' 
precedent plans, important members of the federal judiciary real-
100. Id. at 820 ("[V]oting and publication are, for some judges, strategically intertwined: 
for example, judg~s may be prepared to acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to their 
own preferences, and to vote with the majority, as long as the decision remains un-
published, but can be driven to dissent if the majority insists upon publication.").. 
101. See e.g., ld. (collecting prior research); Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished 
Opinions, 5 GREEN BAG 259, 260-63 (2002); Foa, supra note 63, at 315-40 (citing a six-
month study of Seventh Circuit cases which revealed that fifteen percent of unpublished 
cases were substantively significant and met the publication standards); Robert A. Mead, 
(CUnpublished" Opinions as the Bulk of the Iceberg: Publication Patterns in. the Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, 93 LAw LIBR. J. 589, 602·-oa (2001) 
(examining publication rates by subject matter in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits over a six-
month period and finding great disparity in publication rates, especially in areas where the 
government is a litigant); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 63, at 120 (2001) (finding that 
unpublished decisions have an effect on the- substance of the law and that unpublished 
decisions are not simply routine application of the law but rather contain, "a noticeable 
number of reversals, dissents, or ~oncurrences," and "significant associations between case 
outcome and judicial characteristics''); Wald, supra note 98, at 1374 (noting a six-month 
study of D.C. Circuit cases found forty percent of unpublished cases arguably met the pub-
lication standards and noting she believed that percentage to be much higher in 1995). See 
also Hindberks & Leben, supra note 72 (collecting numer~us unpublished Kansas appellate 
cases that are plainly law-making). 
102. Justice John Paul Stevens, Remarks at the Illinois State Bar Association's Centen-
nial Dinner; Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 22, 1977), quoted in Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chi-
cago Council of Lawyers, Browder v. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (No. 76-
5325), 1977 WL 189280 at *37. 
103. Jeffrey Cole & Elaine E. Bucko, A Life Well Lived.• An Interview with Justice John 
Paul Stevens,. 32 NO. 3 LITIGATION 8, 67 (2006). 
104. John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or 
Invasive Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 123, 128 (2006) (warning of the substantial 
incentive for judges to ''bury [their] departures from or narrowing of precedent" by render-
ing unpublished opinions). 
• 
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ized the potential for harm to the system by careless or overuse of 
the procedural shortcuts. Judge John R. Brown, then-Chief Judge 
of the Fifth Circuit, sought to justify the court's adoption of a lim-
ited publication and precedent rule, but in so doing he warned 
that its use should be sparing and careful: 
[T[he Court, by the adoption of the [precedent-limiting] Rule, 
affirms that it must be carefully and selectively employed ... 
. The Court recognizes that it must the word is must never 
apply the Rule to avoid making a difficult or troublesome de-
cision or to conceal divisive or disturbing issues. This means 
that while Rule 21 should make a real contribution toward 
the goal of avoiding delays which can often amount to a denial 
of justice, it must be sparingly used . . . . The Court itself 
must be vigilant. We believe we are sensitive now to the fac-
tors which would make application of the Rule wrong or un-
wise or inappropriate. It is the Court's purpose to heed them 
and in our own survival assure survival of the system we 
cherish. 105 
Judge Brown's fears have come to pass. 106 A system that both 
permits and structurally encourages such strategic decision-
making based on factors not relevant to the case at bar has lost its 
justice-seeking focus. 
Second, failure to regard each decision as precedent allows for 
unwitting departures from, or needless delay in establishing, set-
tled law. The departures result in a failure to treat similarly situ-
ated parties similarly- a denial of basic equality. In U.S. v. Rive-
ra-Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with no less than 
twenty unpublished circuit opinions blatantly divided on a single, 
simple issue .. 107 Yet because none of the unpublished decisions 
were viewed as precedent, each could be ignored in favor of what-
105. N.L.R.B. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am., AFL-CIO Local 990, 430 F.2d 
966, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1970). 
106. See David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the Jurisprudentially Un-
sound Unpublication System, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (2009) (claiming the current 
use of unpublished opinions is neither sparing nor carefully limited); see also, Jeffrey Cole 
& Elaine E. Bucklo, supra note 103 (quoting Justice Stevens as saying, "Well, I tend to vote 
to grant more on unpublished opinions, on the theory that occasionally judges will use the 
unpublished opinion as a device to reach a decision that might be a little hard to justify."). 
107. 222 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000). Of the twenty decisions identified in Rivera-
Sanchez, eleven decisions ruled in favor of one procedure, six in favor of another, and three 
remanded to force the district courts to take a position on the proper process. Rivera-
Sanchez, 1057 U.S. at 1063. 
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ever the ruling panel assigned to that case found appropriate. 108 
Failure to recognize the inherent precedential value of these deci-
sions allowed these litigants to be treated differently, prevented a 
single law of the circuit to emerge, and caused confusion among 
lawyers and litigants about what to expect from the court on this 
issue. Similarly, in Family Fare, Inc. v. NLRB, the Sixth Circuit 
so blatantly departed from the published standard regarding an 
issue of law that both parties acknowledged the departure from 
precedent.109 Yet, the court issued its decision as unpublished, 
apparently willing to allow its new rule to govern the instant case 
but not to govern cases in the future. 110 This type of unequal 
treatment of litigants resulting from as systematic disregard for 
precedent is not a new occurrence. Its deleterious effects were 
noted in a series of criminal appeals in the early years of the non-
precedential unpublished opinion experiment~111 A series of crim· 
inal appeals found considerable inconsistency over both the legal 
standard ("founded suspicion" or "probable cause") and the stand-
ard of review ("de novo'' or "abuse of discretion") to be applied. 112 
This inconsistency between panels and between published and 
unpublished opinions undermine the critical goal of "uniform . . . 
application of the law."113 
Third, failure to see the precedential value of each of the federal 
courts' decisions allows for splits in the law, yielding different out-
comes depending on the circuit in which the action is brought. If 
equality or fairness are touchstones of justice, such splits are fun-
damentally unjust. Though the Court denied certiorari in Smith 
v. United States, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter 
warned, "[n]onpublication must not be a convenient means to pre-
vent review. An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect 
in the Circuit and surely is as important to the parties concerned 
108. This muddle was exacerbated by the then-current local rule that forbade counsel 
from even mentioning unpublished decisions. 9th Cir. R. 36-3. Following the passage of 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, counsel are at least permitted to tell the eourt 
that its panels are deviating from one another, though nothing compels the panels to stop 
doing it because no precedential value needs to be accorded to any of these decisions. See 
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
109. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Family Fare, 551 U.S. 1133 (No. 06-1536) at *4-
7. 
110. Family Fare, Inc., 205 F. App'x 403. 
111. James N. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 
61 A.B.A. J. 1224, 1225-26 (1975). 
112. Gardner, supra note 111, at 1225-26. 
113. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPML 38 (1976). 
Winter 2011 Precedent and Justice 57 
as is a published opinion."114 Similarly, in St. Louis Southwestern 
Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Han-
dlers, Express & Station Emp., two Justices noted this threat to 
uniformity and dissented from denial of certiorari because Fifth 
Circuit unpublished decision created a split between the circuits 
on an "important question of federal law" that "could easily result 
in the same collective-bargaining contract, or identical ones, being 
interpreted in different ways in different circuits."115 To treat 
some decisions as precedent and others not, interferes with the 
• proper review process. 
Fourth, justice is undermined when precedent is abandoned in 
unpublished opinions because such wrongful decisions are shield-
ed from proper higher court review, which allows uncertainties or 
discrepancies in the substantive law to linger. An unpublished 
opinion is supposed to signal that a case is a routine, non-
controversial application of settled law, but that is not always the 
case. 116 A decision rendered by unpublished opinion has also like-
ly received less judicial attention and has a less well-developed 
record and opinion, which also discourages Supreme Court review. 
In cases like United States v. Edge Broad. Co., and County of Los 
Angeles v. Kling, Justices of the Supreme Court have expressed 
surprise and dismay at the circuit courts' practice of deciding is-
sues of first impression or other close cases by unpublished opin-
ion.117 Justice Marshall, in County of Los Angeles v. Kling, called 
the practice "plainly wrong'' and noted that such summary process 
is done "without the discipline and accountability that the prepa-
ration of opinions requires."llB 
114. 502 U.S. 1017, 1019-20, n.* (1991) (Mem). See also Waller v. United States, 504 
U.S. 962; 964-65 (1992) (White, J. and O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Mem). See also Hyman v. 
Rickman, 446 U.S. 989, 990-92 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Mem) (dissenting from 
denial of certiorari on the grounds that the unpublished circuit opinion was in conflict with 
other circuits on the issue of right to appointed counsel). 
115. 484 U.S. 907 (1987) (Mem.) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
116. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 63, at 120. 
117. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3 (1993) ("We deem it re-
markable and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act 
of Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its 
judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion."); County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 
936, 937-39 (1985) (Marshall J., dissenting) (''The brevity of analysis in the Court of Ap-
peals' unpublished, noncitable opinion, however; does not justify the Court's summary 
reversal ... For, like a court of appeals that issues an opinion that may not be printed or 
cited, this Court then engages in decision-making without the discipline and accountability 
that the preparation of opinions requires."). 
118. Kling, 474 U.S. at 937-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
' ; 
,. 
' 
. 
. 
• 
I 
58 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 49 
Fifth, abandoning precedent, even for practical reasons, under-
mines the people's faith in judges and the judicial system. This 
harkens back to the issue of public perceptions of precedent as 
critical to equality, fairness, and justice. The judiciary is increas-
ingly viewed as powerful and unaccountable.,119 and calls for judi-
cial oversight, impeachment, and transparency seem to be on the 
rise. One reason for this, we propose, is that the judiciary (or at 
least that portion in favor of precedent-free opinions) has viewed 
precedent as a tool for consciously shaping the law rather than an 
inherent part of how the law functions. 12° For an appellate court 
to make law that governs only that single instance and that they 
intend no one to rely upon in the future is contrary to the public's 
sense of justice. This perception is important for both public trust 
as well as to serve as example for, and backstop to, the actions of 
other government entities: 
Appellate justice should be a model for the government's deal-
ings with citizens. Appellate courts are the most dignified 
and receptive authorities to which individuals can turn" .. If 
these courts do not deal justly with litigants, we cannot expect 
agencies or bureaucracies of lesser sensitivity to legal rights 
to do so. It is therefore important that justice on appeal be 
visible to all.121 
If we believe that our courts are guardians of fairness and pro-
tection against all others (individuals, organizations, and even the 
other two branches of government), then they must operate in a 
principled fashion and not in a manner that can yield different 
outcomes for what appear to be idiosyncratic reasons or no reason 
at all. 
By denying the precedential value of so many court decisions, 
we are making our legal system less effective, less consonant with 
public perception of justice, and, ultimately, less just. Loosing our 
119. See, e.g., Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of 
and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 901 (2007) (two national 
surveys indicate that nearly one third of Americans polled believe the Supreme Court "has 
too much power."); Lance Eric Neff, Keys to the Kingdom: Interpretive Power and Societal 
Influence During Two Ages, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 697, 701, n.19 (noting that the judici-
ary is commonly perceived as being "too powerful" and relatively unaccountable). 
120. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating the role of the 
courts is to develop a coherent law and finding in the federal circuit courts the power and 
authority to achieve discretionary review akin to the Supreme Court's discretionary re-
view). 
121. CARRINGTON, supra note 113, at v. 
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courts from the dictates of precedent and rewriting precedent as a 
concept to be bestowed on opinions whose outcomes the court ap-
proves of has eroded our ability to create a just process or reach 
just outcomes. It harms individuals but it also harms the public 
and the legal system as a whole. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We firmly believe that precedent is the cornerstone of justice 
and that abandonment of precedent threatens to undermine both 
the perception and reality of justice in our legal system. Judge 
Richard S. Arnold expressed this belief with extraordinary cour-
age and eloquence: 
It is often said among judges that the volume of appeals is so 
high that it is simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential value 
to every decision. We do not have time to do a decent enough 
job, the argument runs, when put in plain language, to justify 
treating every opinion as a precedent. If this is true, the judi-
cial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the remedy is not 
to create an underground body of law good for one place and 
time only. The remedy, instead, is to create enough judge-
ships to handle the volume, or, if that is not practical, for each 
judge to take enough time to do a competent job with each 
case. If this means that backlogs will grow, the price must 
still be paid.122 
We agree. It is said that hard cases, if we allow them to, make 
bad law.123 We have allowed for too long the hard case of volume 
122. Anastasoff u. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated 235 F.3d 
1054 (2000) (en bane). See also Re Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, 955 
F.2d at 38 (Halloway, J., dissenting): 
I d. 
It may be suggested that in the rush of our business, we must prepare orders and 
judgments which are not written in the form of polished discourses which we wish to 
serve a$ citable opinions. This is the most untenable of the notions suggested for the 
no-citation rule. In light of our caseload, we are obviously driven to entering orders 
which are not the literary models that we would like to produce as opinions. Never-
theless, the basic purpose for stating reasons within an opinion or order should never 
be forgotten that the decision must be able to withstand the scrutiny of analysis, 
against the record evidence, as to its soundness under the Constitution and the stat-
utory and decisional law we must follow, and as to its consistency with our prece-
dents. Our orders and judgments, like our published opinions, should never be 
shielded fro_m searching examination. 
123. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109 (1842) (''This is one of those unfortunate 
cases in which ... it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but 
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pressures on the judiciary to make bad law in the form of non-
precedential decision-making. The idea that a common law court 
can issue a non-precedential decision has never been justified ju-
risprudentially, creates significant harms to litigants and the legal 
system, and tears the justice-seeking mechanism of precedent 
from the heart of the common law endeavor. The bench and bar 
should reaffirm our commitment to justice and our willingness to 
accord precedential value to every decision of our courts. 
by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has frequently been 
observed, are apt to introduce bad law."). 
